Arminianism and Predestination – A Suggestion
Blog 3: Contingent Human Freedom – What’s at Stake?
In the first two blogs of this series, I have tried to provide some evidence for a perspective on human freedom that underlies the rest of what I intend to discuss under the heading “Arminianism and Predestination – A Suggestion.” That perspective is rooted in the conviction that human freedom is not metaphysically libertarian—that is, humans have not been, from the moment of their creation, autonomously free. Humans, as is true of the larger universe which we inhabit, have been narrated in Genesis 1 and 2 as subordinated to the Word of God. I have argued, and continue to maintain, that human freedom is a consequence of grace—of God’s continued activity in the universe He has created—and not an essential and inherent quality of human nature.
Humans, as all creatures in the universe, have some capacity for self-determination naturally. My point has not been to argue that creatures in the universe do nothing whatsoever except by the specific decree of God. However, in qualified agreement with those who call themselves compatibilists, I do believe that God has set limits which constrain human freedom to such a degree that the concept of metaphysical libertarianism is simply inconsistent with the way in which human choice has been narrated in the Christian Scriptures. Any truly libertarian choice that a person makes, in this way of thinking, is a consequence of God’s grace and not an endowment of human nature.
Though this sort of medium does not lend itself to the defense of these positions exhaustively, I have endeavored to support these contentions in the first two blogs in two different ways. In blog 1, I attempted to illustrate this distinction between nature and grace in human freedom narratively and biblically. In blog 2, I struggled to explain the nuanced logic of James Arminius which leads inevitably, in my reading, to this sort of an understanding of human freedom.
What is at stake in this issue for me, however, should really begin to take shape in these next few blog entries. Of principle importance for this installment is the dismissing of a commonly held Arminian conviction that I believe has proven to be particularly difficult to reconcile with the testimony of Christian Scripture. And, it is the belief that God either cannot or will not violate the so-called ‘integrity of the human person’ by compelling her or him to do this or that.
If one accepts metaphysical libertarianism or believes that libertarian free will is an endowment of human nature guaranteed by God in all circumstances, then this idea that God will not violate human freedom makes a great deal of sense. However, if human freedom is understood in ways similar to the one I am advocating in this series of blogs, then the question of God’s overriding of human freedom becomes somewhat nonsensical.
Why is that? Well, in my opinion, the natural state of humanity is to be overridden by the Word of God. Only God’s grace can grant truly free choices—i.e., choices undetermined by the specific will of God or the natural restraints God has set in place. Therefore, in this way of thinking, it is not problematic at all if God were to elect, predestine, or forcibly cause a human agent to do almost anything. That, if I am correct, would be the most natural relationship anything in creation has to God, including humanity itself. Here I believe that the Calvinist tradition has observed something in Scripture that we, as Arminians, must also confess: God’s Sovereignty is not subordinated to human freedom in the narratives of Scripture. As Arminius himself has argued to the contrary, human freedom, rightly construed, is naturally subordinated to the Providence and Sovereignty of God.
Now, don’t read me wrongly. I do believe that, in His grace, God grants the larger portion of humanity such libertarian freedom that from a certain, very human, perspective it can appear as though human freedom is an endowment of human nature. The point I am trying to make is that this very freedom that so many of us enjoy is not a natural endowment, but a gracious gift of God’s continuing activity in the universe. Therefore, when Scripture narrates God as not permitting that sort of freedom to a person, what we are witnessing is not God abnormally over-riding human autonomy. Rather, those narratives illustrate instances in which God refused to intervene to permit the human being in question to act unnaturally—to act freely.
In the next blog, I will return to a biblical, narrative approach and deal with the Gospel of John—a book, to my reading, which makes little sense apart from the perspective on human freedom that I am trying to advocate.
J. Thomas
Josh,
This is a theological gem! Thank you for sharing Arminius’ thoughts on his proposed doctrine of divine concurrence.
Perhaps the most troubling matter in the Wesleyan-Arminian tradition that I have personally wrestled with has been the seeming conflict between the scientific observations of our era and the teachings of my particular branch of the church. More specifically, I think of the relationship between our genetic foundation and its expression found in the variety of bodies inherited by the many creatures in the world. Though I had known in my heart-of-hearts that this conflict must have been due to the insecurities and limitations of our own humanity (and this on both sides of the argument) than to any real conflicts between the scriptures and the observable world, I didn’t know how to verbalize my hesitations. I think in many ways Arminius’ doctrine of divine concurrence puts into words what I had only sensed in my heart.
The Word that God spoke from the very beginning seems very much sovereign over the creation, and we can see the evidence of this governance in ourselves through the many contingencies that sit at the very foundation of our nature. However, something within the human species has been bestowed on us so that our foundation need not drive us by total necessity (and I would even say that these qualities can be found in other creatures within our world).
My own wrestling with and study of the language of “image of God” in Genesis (the language often tied to the doctrine of libertarian freedom) has led me to Psalm 8 and other places in the First Testament where humanity’s likeness to God are defined as our having been given governance of the things that God has made (not as an inherent quality of freedom). “Freedom,” as you have suggested in this discussion, should not be defined metaphysically but rather as contingent upon an act of God’s grace, something I believe we find further supported in Psalm 8: “When I look upon your heaven, the work of your hands, the moon and the stars that you set in place, what is enosh that you remember, or the son of ‘adam that you pay any heed? For you have lowered [them to be] little less than elohim, and [with] both glory and honor you crowned [them].” Humanity’s nature (i.e. ontology) as far as the Psalmist is concerned is no different than the rest of the creatures of this world. Our uniqueness only comes through a continual act of God to distinguish us from the rest (i.e. his grace). I think this Psalm expresses beautifully the idea that Arminius wished to convey through his doctrine of divine concurrence.
Peace,
Michael
If all this is true, then why does man, who has the desire to do good, continue to do evil? (Romans 7) In your explanation, wouldn’t it be God’s fault for giving him the freedom to choose the evil, even though his desire would be to do good?
Nate, this is tangential to the point I am making, but important, I agree. I touched on the issue of human fallenness briefly in the first two blogs of the series.
Suffice it to say here, that I have argued that humanity was graced a libertarian choice by God in Eve and Adam in which God graced the first humans with the capacity to choose against their natures–i.e., to choose to sin. The consequence of that choice, which I believe God concurrently willed with the first humans (see blog 2) was a temporarily permanent, unnatural state. Rather than being subordinated to the will of God, humans have been subordinated to corruption, by the concurrent will of God. This does not mean that somehow, in our fallen state, humanity lives outside of God’s providence or sovereignty, but it does mean that God, in willing concurrently with the first humans, has ensured that humanity’s slavery to corruption has persisted from that day to this, generally.
The Romans 7 passage that you have cited, to my reading, is not a discussion of humanity generally, but of humanity in the process of being released from the consequence of that first libertarian choice through God’s prevenient grace by means of the law. The Law, for Paul, is capable of revealing the truth about humanity and of revealing the will of God for us, and perhaps even of beginning the process of God’s gracious gift of libertarian freedom to choose to follow God. But, in Paul’s argument, the law cannot free us from the bondage to corruption we have chosen–i.e., the law can free us to choose to follow God, but it cannot enable humanity to actualize or realize that wish. This is the state of ‘I do not do what I want to do’ that Paul has articulated.
I see Paul’s description as evidence of God’s prevenient grace enabling fallen humanity to make a libertarian choice to follow God. Once that choice is made, however, the human is not free to actualize it. God must grant the freedom that He has enabled the human to choose. This is the dilemma of law, for Paul, and perhaps why Paul went on in Romans 8 to describe the new life made possible only by the Spirit. In my opinion, anyway.